Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach by Hodges, Christopher





This Article gives an overview of the kaleidoscope of developing
mechanisms for dispute resolution in European jurisdictions and ex-
plains why generally few multi-party actions exist in Europe.  It
summarizes the seminal 1993 European Commission survey of alter-
native mechanisms and the major trends and developments since
then (Section I), and the current status of national litigation proce-
dural rules on class actions and the extent of class action litigation
(Section II).  It then analyzes this current status (Sections III and IV).
Section V notes important differences between the approaches in the
United States and the European Union, and Section VI considers the
need for a basic class mechanism in Europe.
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
European jurisdictions approach the resolution of disputes, par-
ticularly those involving consumers, in a number of different ways.
Until efforts within the past ten years or so by the European Com-
munity authorities to harmonize certain topics, the choice and devel-
opment of mechanisms had been entirely an individual matter for
each of the twenty or so governments of Western Europe.  The inevi-
table patchwork of laws and mechanisms that has resulted does, how-
ever, contain a number of strong similarities of general approach,
which reflect some important differences from the approach of other
trading blocks, notably North America.  In 1993, the European
Commission surveyed the available mechanisms in EEC member
states relating to access for consumer disputes.1  Part III of that re-
port analyzed these mechanisms under the following headings:
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A. Protection of Individual Rights2
The Commission found that member states had attempted to fa-
cilitate the settlement of consumer disputes using three different
mechanisms:
• by simplifying court procedures applicable to small disputes;
• by instituting out-of-court procedures specifically devoted to
consumer disputes, either at the initiative of public authori-
ties or, more frequently, industry; such procedures are either
an alternative to going to court (arbitration of consumer dis-
putes, as in Spain, Portugal, Netherlands) or complementary
and/or pre-litigation procedures (like mediation or concilia-
tion); and
• by creating a joint representation action, in which a con-
sumer organization may take action on behalf of consumers
who have suffered individual harm caused by the same entity
and having a common origin.3
The Commission noted that the first mechanism, the simplifica-
tion of court procedures, was instituted in member states by the fol-
lowing methods:
1. reform of the Code of Civil Procedure, designed not only to
simplify the settlement of “small claims” but also to streamline
procedures in general and eliminate the backlog of pending
cases (Belgium 1992, Italy 1990 and 1991, Germany 1993);
2. creation of “simplified” procedures . . . for disputes of a civil
character below a certain sum (France 1988, Netherlands 1991,
Portugal 1991, United Kingdom 1988);
3. creation of a (simplified and) special procedure solely available
to consumers for disputes whose value does not exceed a spe-
cific sum (Ireland 1991).4
The paper further noted that disputes below a certain value were
governed by a specific method in all member states.5  The common
features of this method were as follows:
1. simplified procedures for bringing an action (simplified refer-
ral—a registered letter, or a simple declaration recorded by the
judge or a clerk of the court) and
2. the fact that a lawyer’s assistance is not required and
2. Id. at 54.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 54-55 (internal citations omitted).
5. See id. at 55.
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3. a prior attempt to effect conciliation (which is mandatory in
most countries) by the presiding judge.6
B. Protection of Collective Interests7
The Commission reported some member states had delegated
the protection of collective interests to an autonomous or independ-
ent administrative authority (for example, the Director General of
Fair Trading in the United Kingdom, the Consumer Ombudsman in
Denmark, or the Director of Consumer Affairs in Ireland).8  In eight
member states, consumer organizations were recognized as having
locus standi to apply to the courts for an injunction or prohibition or-
der regarding forbidden or unfair commercial practices.9  Germany
created this mechanism through legislation enacted in 1909, 1965, and
1976; Greece and Spain, in 1991; France, in 1988 and 1992; Italy, in
1990 and 1992; Luxembourg, in 1983 and 1986; and Netherlands and
Portugal, in 1981.10  A further method exists in Belgium where, since
1991, legal protection of collective interests may be undertaken by
both consumer organizations and an administrative authority.11
C. Aid for Legal Advice and Legal Aid12
The Commission had undertaken a number of pilot projects in
member states, from which it concluded the following in its Green
Paper:
the pilot projects prompted by the Commission (see in particular
the ongoing projects in Ireland, Italy and Greece) show that a very
large percentage of consumer disputes can be settled without going
to court at all, provided a counselling service is made available to
consumers (this service must be free of charge or at least its price
must be “accessible” to the consumer).13
The Commission commented that in two member states (United
Kingdom and France), public finance was provided for legal advice,
as through Citizens Advice Bureaus.14  A later report by the Commis-
sion extensively examined legal aid, finding that legal aid for court
6. Id.





12. Id. at 68.
13. Id.
14. See id.
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proceedings is available in all member states but in widely differing
forms, including any of the following:
[P]rovision of free or low-cost legal advice or court representation
by a lawyer; partial or total exemption from other costs, such as
court fees, that would normally be levied; [and] direct financial as-
sistance to defray any of the costs associated with litigation, such as
lawyers’ costs, court fees, witness expenses, liability of a losing party
to support winners’ costs, etc.15
D. Community Developments
Since the 1993 snapshot outlined above, developments have
taken place both in the context of member states’ national reforms
and in the context of the European Community’s multi-state reforms.
Individual member states have continued to expand or innovate
across the broad spectrum of national mechanisms.  For example, It-
aly, Portugal, and Spain have joined France in permitting representa-
tive actions by consumer organizations.16  Further progress has been
made with respect to consumer or small claims mechanisms, om-
budsmen, industry codes of practice, and conciliation systems.17  A
particularly significant development is the revolutionary reform of
litigation procedure in England and Wales, where the Civil Procedure
Rules of 1998 are based on principles of removing complexity, cost,
and delay.  In these 1998 Rules, emphasis is placed on judicial man-
agement of cases, a requirement for proportionality between costs
and amounts in dispute, and the pre-action exchange of statements of
case and evidence, so parties may settle disputes as early as possible.18
These factors have reduced the number of proceedings commenced,
increased early mediation of claims, and limited the extent of legal
work.  This system is being considered carefully by other govern-
ments and is likely to spread.
15. Green Paper from the Commission, Legal Aid in Civil Matters: The Problems Con-
fronting the Cross-Border Litigant, COM (2000) 51 final, Feb. 9, 2000, at 2; see also European
Commission, Guide to Legal Aid and Advice in the European Economic Area (1996).
16. See the French case, Cour de cassation 1st civ., 5 Oct. 1999, Union Federal des Con-
sommateurs (UFC 38) v. Emme, Juris Data no 003376, as noted by Sandie Chillon, CONSUMER
L. J. v.7(4), 529-530 (1999).
17. As one example from England and Wales, see the introduction of three “tracks” in a
civil action under the Civil Procedure Rules, allocation to which is based primarily on the value
of the case.  This means that there is a separate small claims track for claims up to £5,000 and
£15,000.  Also, some U.K. courts offer mediation schemes, for example, Central London
County Court.
18. See C. PRO. R., Rule 1.
HODGES.DOC 08/06/01  12:51 PM
2001] MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS: A EUROPEAN APPROACH 325
Developments have also occurred at the European Community
level.  Pursuant to its remit to facilitate cross-border trade (and there-
fore also resolution of cross-border disputes) in order to create the
Community’s single internal market, the European Commission has
taken various measures to reduce transnational barriers between
member states and to promote harmonized approaches.  The ap-
proach to some issues has to be made with care, but some progress is
continuing to be made, especially in four main areas of reform.
First, given the observation noted above that many consumer
disputes are small claims that can be settled quickly by simplified
mechanisms, the European Commission has promulgated a standard
Consumer Complaint Form, emphasized the need for member states
to have simplified procedures with no or minimal cost or involvement
of lawyers, and made steps to create a network of bodies responsible
for the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes and the standard
consumer complaint form.19
Secondly, based on some national precedents, Directive
98/27/EC permits consumer organizations to apply to courts in fellow
member states for an injunction against an infringement of any of a
number of consumer trading Directives, covering areas such as mis-
leading advertising, unfair contract terms, consumer credit, package
holidays, and consumer guarantees, committed in the organization’s
own state by an entity in the fellow state.  This mechanism avoids
the need for a class action device; but, although it may be appropriate
on horizontal consumer trading issues, it involves enormous and
seemingly insurmountable difficulties where any individual issues
must be resolved.
Thirdly, in 1999 the European Commission issued a Green Paper
on cross-border legal aid as part of European policy on the creation
of an area of freedom, security, and justice.21  Its focus on legal aid at
this time is somewhat ironic, given considerable variation in the
availability of legal aid across the member states (by the Paper’s own
definition,22 some states only have de facto pro bono systems with no
public funding) and given the clear experience of the United King-
19. See Commission Recommendation 98/25, of Mar. 30, 1998, on the Principles Applica-
ble to the Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 1998 O.J. (L
115) 0031-0034; Council Resolution of May 25, 2000, on a Community-Wide Network of Na-
tional Bodies for the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 2000 O.J. (C 155) 1.

 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51.
21. Green Paper from the Commission: Legal Aid in Civil Matters: The Problems Con-
fronting the Cross-Border Litigant, COM (00)51 final, Feb. 9, 2000.
22. See id.
HODGES.DOC 08/06/01  12:51 PM
326 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 11:321
dom and Sweden that legal aid does not work well and that legal
services should be privately financed.23  In 1997 Sweden provided that
private legal expenses insurance (“LEI”) policies should be empha-
sized and given priority over state support.24  LEI is widespread in
Sweden and Germany, and it is possible that its existence discourages
poor or speculative claims.
Fourthly, where litigation is appropriate, various international
conventions exist on legal mechanisms, in the context either of the
Community (former Article 220 of the EC Treaty25) or of The Hague
Conference on Private International Law.26  The Commission is cur-
rently in the process of developing further the following items:
The Brussels Convention of September 27, 1968, on jurisdiction
and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters;27
• The Rome Convention of June 19, 1980, on the law applica-
ble to contractual obligations;28
• The Hague Convention of November 15, 1965, on the service
abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil and
commercial matters;29
• The Hague Convention of March 10, 1970, on the taking of
evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters;30
• The Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, designed to fa-
cilitate international access to the courts,31 which has only
been signed by a minority of the member states.
23. See generally THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID (Francis Regan et al. eds., 1999).
24. See Francis Regan, Retreat from Equal Justice? Assessing the Recent Swedish Legal Aid
and Family Law Reforms, 19 CIV. JUST. Q. 168 (2000).
25. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224)
1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
26. See The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Oct. 9, 1951, 220 U.N.T.S.
121.
27. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1978 O.J. (L 304/77) v.21.  See now Council Regulation (EC) No
44/2001 of Dec. 22, 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Regulation and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J. (L 012) Jan. 16, 2001, pp.1-23.
28. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Oct. 9, 1980 O.J.
(L 266/1) v. 23.
29. See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 658 U.N.T.S. 162.
30. See 847 U.N.T.S. 231; U.K.T.S. 20(1977), Cmnd 6727; 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. 7444;
J.O.F. 17 Apr 75; 1975 R.T.A.F. 22; 57 Vert A 748; 102 JDI 635; RCH p.152.
31. See Misc 14 (1981), Cmnd 8281; 19 ILM 1505; RCH p.284.
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E. Comments on the European Approach
An innocent observer of the European scene could be forgiven
for commenting that the current position on access to justice across
the member states is confusing, with various different mechanisms
existing contemporaneously.  It is, however, possible to analyze this
pluralistic approach, as the Commission did in its 1993 report, under
broad headings, and then to conclude that a number of these mecha-
nisms are—or have the potential to be—valid, useful, speedy, and
cost-efficient dispute resolution methods that deserve further investi-
gation, development, and promulgation.32  Within this developmental
process, it may also be possible to bring about a convergence of those
national systems that currently differ, whether systemically or in de-
tail.
Many of the European access to justice and dispute resolution
mechanisms represent an approach to economic and social policy that
rejects an adversarial approach and excessive or unnecessary transac-
tional costs but favors conciliation at proportionate costs.  European
policy emphasizes social cohesion rather than an approach stressing
the individualistic vindication of personal rights.
II.  THE CURRENT STATUS OF MULTIPLE CLAIMS
IN EUROPE
A. Rules of Procedure
The first factual observation is that it is only recently that some
European jurisdictions have introduced a rule of court procedure on
the recognition or management of a multi-party action.  For example,
a Group Actions Act came into force in The Netherlands on May 1,
1994.  Some class action provisions (with limitations) are contained in
the Portuguese Law 83/95 of August 31, 1995.  A rule of civil proce-
dure on group litigation was introduced in England and Wales in May
2000.33  The Civil Procedure Act 1/2000 of January 10, 2000, intro-
duced a class action mechanism in January 2001 in Spain for entities
entitled to defend the interests of their members.  The Scottish Law
Commission has considered34 (but in 2000 rejected) a need to intro-
32. See Green Paper Presented by the Commission: Access of Consumers to Justice and
the Settlement of Consumer Disputes in the Single Market, supra note 1.
33. See C.J.S. HODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS (Oxford, 2001) (discussing C. PRO. R.
19.III).
34. See Scottish Law Commission, Multi-Party Actions: Report by Working Party (1993);
Scottish Law Commission, Multi-Party Actions: Court Proceedings and Funding (1994).
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duce a multi-party rule.  Proposals have languished in Sweden35 and
Finland,36 but the debate in the former might be revived.  No specific
multi-party rules, therefore, exist in a significant number of Euro-
pean states, notably Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland,
and the Central European states.
B. Experience of Multi-Party Cases
The second factual observation is that the only European juris-
dictions that have any significant experience with multi-party actions
for compensatory damages are the common law countries: England
and Wales have had a succession of major cases since the early 1980s,
sometimes with the same litigation replicated in later years in Scot-
land and Ireland.  The principal cases have typically involved hun-
dreds and sometimes thousands of claimants.  The subject matter of
these cases has largely been pharmaceutical product liability claims;
other product sectors have been noticeably absent and other types of
claims (for example, financial or environmental cases) have been
much rarer.
A summary of these major completed cases in England and
Wales is given at Table 1.  There are two other remarkable features
of these cases: first, the claimants were funded almost entirely by le-
gal aid, rather than by private or trade union funding or by legal ex-
penses insurance, and second, the success rate of many of the cases
was low.  These aspects call for detailed examination, in Section III
below, but it should be noted here that this experience shows that
where multi-party claims predominantly involve individual issues
(which the product liability cases almost always do, whereas other
types of case may not), a court mechanism that seeks to resolve all
the cases in a group by focusing mainly on actual or supposed com-
mon issues, at the expense of individual issues, will run into difficul-
ties.  Many of the English cases failed on their individual facts, but
this was not apparent for some time, as the facts were not investi-
gated until the group claims had proceeded some distance.  These ob-
servations raise the issue of the suitability of certain types of cases,
such as product liability, for group resolution.
35. See SOU 1994:151, However, 1994 proposals have been revived in 2000.
36. See Klaus Vittanen, Note, 7 CONSUMER L.J. 140 (1999).
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III.  ANALYSIS
A. What’s Different About Some Jurisdictions?
The observation that multi-party litigation exists as a phenome-
non in some jurisdictions but not others37 prompts an analysis of the
reasons that certain jurisdictions may attract or repel multi-party
claims.  Such an analysis38 reveals the importance of a range of differ-
ent factors, notably the following:
• the ability of lawyers to advertise (permitted in England
since 1988 but prohibited in most other European jurisdic-
tions);
• the extent of any funding requirement for the claimant, prin-
cipally to pay his lawyers, experts, and court fees.  There is
none under a U.S. contingency fee system, nor is there such a
requirement for some people under the pre-2000 English Le-
gal Aid system.39  From 2000 onwards, the reformed English
system of a conditional fee agreement (described below)
similarly requires no, or restricted, personal contribution.
• the extent of any financial risk for the claimant if he loses.
European jurisdictions differ on the extent (and amount) to
which a losing party will have to pay the winner’s legal and
expert costs.  Such costs could amount to considerable sums
where they are unregulated, whereas rules in Germany, for
example, regulate and restrict the reimbursement of the win-
ner’s lawyers’ fees for contentious work.40  In England and
Wales the normal rule has always been that the loser pays
(most of) the winner’s cost, but this rule was effectively set
aside where the claimant was publicly aided, leaving the
37. Multi-party litigation is present in the United States, in Canada (to a much lesser ex-
tent), and in Australia; in Europe, however, it exists principally only in the Western common
law jurisdictions, notably England and Wales.
38. See C.J.S. Hodges, Factors Influencing the Incidence of Multiple Claims, J. OF
PERSONAL INJURY LITIG. 289 (1999); see generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES IN OECD COUNTRIES (1995)
(providing a comparative discussion of product liability systems in OECD member states and
the factors contributing to their differences).
39. Legal aid was available only to those with disposable income and capital below certain
limits; the poorest of these would make no personal contribution, but a sliding scale of personal
contributions applied at the upper end.
40. The losing party must reimburse the winning party’s lawyer’s fees calculated in accor-
dance with BRAGO (German Attorney’s Fees Schedule) which calculates fees on the basis of
the amount in dispute.  This is the case even if the winner has agreed to a higher fee with his
lawyer (for example, a fee charged on an hourly basis).
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claimant with no risk, as in almost all U.S. states.  Under the
new English conditional fee system, the claimant’s risk is
covered by insurance.
• the predictability of the court’s decision.  The U.S. jury sys-
tem introduces a level of instability by lowering the level of
intellectual and scientific understanding of which the court is
capable.  While judges may similarly vary, some have very
high capacity.
• the level of damages that might be awarded.  The general
level in the United States is high compared with European
jurisdictions, even though principles and amounts vary within
Europe.41  No European jurisdiction generally permits puni-
tive damages; their existence in the United States, even
though relatively infrequently awarded or confirmed on ap-
peal, contributes to higher settlements.
Certain other factors, while relevant in other contexts, appear ir-
relevant in the current situation.  For example, in the product liability
context, there are no significant differences in the substantive liability
law of jurisdictions in the first world block (all have advanced con-
cepts of negligence, strict liability, and breach of contract), and no
significant general differences in the level of safety of products mar-
keted in the different trading blocks.  It is implausible, for example,
that the level of safety of pharmaceuticals is lower in England and
Wales than in other European jurisdictions.  Indeed, it is often the
case that the same products (with the same design, manufacturing
controls, and standardized labelling) are marketed across the world
and are subject to similar extensive regulatory controls, which are
identical throughout Europe.
The information that exists on the level of safety of products
marketed in Europe indicates that quality and safety are high and
that few product liability claims are to be expected.42  Therefore, the
only plausible explanation of the U.K. phenomenon of the past fif-
teen years of a succession of large multi-party actions involving
pharmaceuticals is the concern over the safety of medicines, origi-
nated in individuals who may have suffered side effects (and some
who claimed did not) and turned by media attention into a matter of
41. See DAVID MACINTOSH & MARJORIE HOLMES, PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS IN EU
AND EFTA COUNTRIES (2d ed. 1994).
42. See the many responses by industry to the European Commission’s 1999 Green Paper
on Directive 85/374/EEC on product liability published at <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/en/goods/liability/replies.htm>.
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incompletely informed public concern.  Given the hype, some pres-
sure groups and a very small number of lawyers were able to attempt
to channel the issues into a quasi-enquiry through the courts.  While
generalized demands could be made by claimants for “justice” and
“compensation,” their lawyers were able to derive sometimes enor-
mous financial benefit from payments made to them by the legal aid
fund, without regard to whether they won or lost.  Almost all of the
individual claims were struck out or withdrawn in the interlocutory
stages.  There should be no surprise at the general failure of these
claims; it is generally recognized that medicinal products can cause
side effects, but the safety of medicines, including their labelling, is
heavily regulated by governmental agencies.
B. Alternative Mechanisms
A further observation that can be made is that many European
civil law jurisdictions have included for years a procedure whereby
one or more individuals can join as a partie civile to an on-going
criminal investigation or prosecution, such that if the court declares
the defendant to have criminal liability, it may also order compensa-
tion to be paid to the partie civile.  This mechanism has the obvious
advantage of allowing a consumer simply to lodge a complaint with
the relevant regulator or investigating judge,43 who then takes the
burden and cost of investigation, and if a successful criminal com-
plaint ensues44 the consumer obtains an award of compensation, al-
beit perhaps from a different court.  It was this mechanism, rather
than a direct compensation suit, that was invoked, for example, by
the claimants in the leading Spanish case involving adulterated grape
seed oil.45  The mechanism is well established in Germany, France, It-
aly, and other states.  It also exists in England.46
The existence of this procedure, which is rarely reported, chal-
lenges the common lawyer’s traditional separation of criminal and
civil cases into distinct procedural streams and provides an alterna-
tive mechanism to private multiple compensation claims.  This model
also suggests a different balance between control of behavior by
43. See, e.g., C. PÉN. (Fr.), Art. 121-3, C. COM. [Fr.], Art. L. 221-1 through L. 223-3, L.
223-1, L. 223-2, and R. 223-1 and 223-2.
44. See, e.g., C. COM. (Fr.), Art. L. 215-10.
45. Tribunal Supremo, Sentencia de 23-4-1992, Sala de lo Penal (Ponente: D. Enrique Ba-
cigalup Zapater), Recurso num. 3654/1990.  Tribunal Supremo, Sentencia de 26-9-1997, num.
895/1997, Sala de lo Penal, (Ponente: D. Gregario Garcai Ancos), Recurso num. 2569/1996.
46. See Powers of Criminal Courts Act, 1973, §35 (Eng.).
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regulation and compensatory liability than has developed in, notably,
the United States, a point that will be discussed further below.
IV.  LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE CASES IN
ENGLAND AND WALES
The above history illustrates the problems that can occur when a
litigation funding system has structural weaknesses.  Various impor-
tant lessons need to be learned from the failure of the English legal
aid system in relation to the expense of multiple cases, supplier-
induced demand on a public funding system, and the need for proper
scrutiny of claims.
A. Expense
Prior to reform in 1999, the United Kingdom had a legal aid sys-
tem introduced in 1949 as part of consistent “welfare state” reforms
enacted after the war.  The legal aid system was based on public
funding of payments to private sector lawyers for advice and repre-
sentation given to citizens whose disposable income and capital fell
below certain thresholds.  Initially, the scheme covered eighty per-
cent of the population.47
However, the scheme became ever more expensive.  The legal
aid budget was the only major national expenditure program that was
not subject to a budget or a cap.  It was difficult to control rises in
costs of private suppliers of legal services, despite successive attempts
made during the 1990s through mechanisms such as franchising.
There were also issues of variable and inferior quality of the legal
services provided by private suppliers, although attempts were made
to control quality by requiring certain suppliers to be members of
particular specialist panels and to operate quality systems.  However,
the gross and net costs of the system increased enormously, particu-
larly from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, and, as a result, successive
governments reduced the financial thresholds for eligibility, so that
fewer people qualified for legal aid even if they made a contribution
to the cost.48  The system was finally largely scrapped and replaced by
47. See Arabella Thorp and Patsy Richards, The Access to Justice Bill: Legal aid, Research
Paper 99/33, 22 March 1999, House of Commons Library at 7.
48. The costs order would be made but subject to the restriction that it should not be en-
forced without leave of the court, which would only be granted where the defendant showed
that he would otherwise suffer severe financial hardship.  See Legal Aid Act, §18(4) (1988)
(Eng.).  The Board contributed to the costs of only 158 successful unassisted defendants in 1994-95
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private funding (conditional fee agreements) supported by limited
public funding (under a more flexible, prioritized, and capped Fund-
ing Code).49  The new approach is explained in the Appendix to this
Article.
It is possible to see the attraction of lawyers to legal aid from the
1980s as a reaction to other structural changes affecting the legal
market.  The percentage of legal aid cases involving tort claims tri-
pled (from 13% to 29%) between 1980-91 and 1993-94.50  Meanwhile,
during the 1980s, solicitors had lost their monopoly in conveyancing
(real estate)51 but had in return been given the right to advertise.52
The property market crashed in 1989, leading to a significant fall in
the number of property transactions, a fall in the number of solicitors
engaged in conveyancing (from 22,000 in 1989 to 15,000 in 199753),
and a fall in earnings from conveyancing (for firms with fewer than
twenty-five partners and gross fee income more than £15,000, income
from conveyancing fell from 22% to 16%, and income from commer-
cial property fell from 20 to 11%54).  Faced with these difficulties, di-
versification into what by the early 1990s seemed a promising new area
of multi-party actions with guaranteed legal aid income offered enor-
mous appeal.55
In the five years from 1985 to 1990, the number of civil legal aid
certificates for non-matrimonial cases increased by 22%, gross expen-
diture rose by 120% to £153 million and net expenditure by 145% to
£76 million.56  Over the same period, the average legal aid bill rose by
60%, from £950 to £1,526.57  In 1990, thirty-six million people, or 66%
of the population, were eligible on income grounds for non-
and 186 in 1993-94.  See House of Commons Hansard Debates, Written Answers to Questions, col.
876, July 2, 1996.
49. The Funding Code: In Accordance with the Access to Justice Act (1999).  (See also § 8
of the Act.)  Controller of HM Stationery Office (Norwich 2000).
50. See Mike Hope, Expenditure on Legal Services, p.30, table 3 (Government Economic
Service Working Paper 132, 1997).
51. See Administration of Justice Act, 1985 (Eng.).  See in particular, § 6, which amended
§ 22 Solicitors Act 1974 (restricting an unqualified person not to prepare certain documents).
52. See Solicitors Practice Rules 1936/72, amended Oct. 1, 1984; see now the Solicitors
Publicity Code.
53. See Bill Cole, Solicitors in Private Practice, Their Work and Expectations (The Law
Society Research Study No.26, 1997).
54. See Mike Hope, Expenditure on Legal Services (Government Economic Service Working
Paper No.132, 1997).
55. Tim Weekes, Class Acts, L. SOC’Y GAZETTE no. 94/47, at 20 (Dec. 10, 1997).
56. See Review of Financial Conditions for Legal Aid: A Consultation Paper (Lord Chancel-
lor’s Department, June 1991).
57. See id.
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matrimonial civil legal aid.58  For personal injury claims, thirty-eight
million people, or 69% of the population, were eligible.59  There was
then a sharp increase in legal aid in 1990-91.  In the four years from
1990-91 to 1993-94, there was no change in GDP and total government
expenditure increased by 12%, but total legal aid expenditure in-
creased by 55%, of which 74% was accounted for by civil legal aid.60
For civil legal aid within this period, total real spending increased by
91% and unit cost by 51% but volume by only 27%.61  In 1993-94 ex-
penditure on legal aid was five times the level in 1979-80 (in real terms
as deflated by the Treasury GDP deflator).62  In contrast, total govern-
ment expenditure had increased over that period by 29% and GDP by
24%.63  From 1990 to 1997, the cost of civil and family legal aid tripled
to £671 million, and, most significantly, the average cost of a case in-
creased by 53% above inflation, while the number of people helped fell
by almost 30%.64
B. Supplier-Induced Demand
A structural fault of the legal aid system was that suppliers de-
termined the type, quality, and cost of the legal services that were
provided.  Accordingly, there was extensive criticism that demand for
legal aid was supplier-led.65  Indeed, there has been strong criticism,
58. See House of Commons Hansard Debates, Written Answers to Questions, col. 490-
491, May 22, 1991.
59. See id.
60. See Gwyn Bevan, Has There Been Supplier-Induced Demand for Legal Aid?, 15 CIV.
JUST. Q. 98, 106, 108 (1996).
61. See id. at 109.
62. See id. at 106.
63. See id.
64. See House of Commons Hansard Debates, col. 1060, Mar. 4, 1998; Gwyn Bevan, Ex-
planatory Notes: Access to Justice Act 1999, reprinted in A READER ON RESOURCING CIVIL
JUSTICE (Alan Paterson & Tamara Goriely eds., 1996).
65. See LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE LORD
CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1995); GWYN BEVAN
ET AL., ORGANIZING COST-EFFECTIVE ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1994); CAROL HARLOW &
RICHARD RAWLINGS, PRESSURE THROUGH LAW 296 (1992); Richard Abel, The Paradoxes of
Legal Aid, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 379 (Jeremy Cooper & Rajeev Dhavan eds., 1986);
Bevan, supra note 60; Erhard Blankenburg, The Lawyers’ Lobby and the Welfare State: The Po-
litical Economy of Legal Aid, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID, supra note 23, at 113;
Mel Cousins, The Politics of Legal Aid - A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 13 CIV. JUST. Q.
111, 121-125 (1994); Overturning the Trough, THE ECONOMIST, June 22, 1996, at 34 (“The nub
of the problem is that, aside from plaintiffs or defendants themselves, the people who benefit from
legal aid are the same as those who largely determine whether it should be granted: lawyers.  The
result is supplier-induced demand.”); Philip Stephens, The Injustice of Rationing, FIN. TIMES, July
23, 1996, at 16 (“The lawyers have not helped.  Some have treated legal aid as a blank cheque.
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notably from the judiciary, that advertising by some lawyers has gen-
erated claims that have often been claims of poor quality.66  Although
the professional and self-regulatory association has recognized this
problem,67 it has not acted to control it (as it could, for example, by
amending the Solicitors’ Practice Rules).
The new Rule of Court on Group Litigation specifies under the
heading “Publicizing the GLO” that a copy of a Group Litigation
Order shall be given to the Law Society and the Senior Master of the
Queen’s Bench Division.68  The management court does, however,
have power to control publicity.  Experience of the major cases shows
that failure to use this power will lead to difficulties by generating
poor claims and by inflating public expectations of success which in-
evitably will not be realized, leading to a lack of confidence in the
system.69
C. No Costs Risk to the Unsuccessful Plaintiff
The normal rule in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and, to some
extent, a number of other European jurisdictions, is that whoever
loses a case (or makes a payment in settlement) should pay the ma-
jority of the opponent’s legal costs; this usually amounts to a signifi-
cant sum, often equal to or exceeding the value of small claims.  This
cost allocation rule is supported on economic principles.70  It aims to
discourage weak cases, to encourage early settlements that reflect the
strength of each party’s case, and to enable the winner to have the
remedy, if plaintiff, or to fend off the claim, if defendant, without
Fees have risen sharply and cases have been brought before the courts for no other reason than to
enrich the legal profession.”).  But see Alan Patterson & Tamara Goriely, Rushcliffe Fifty Years
On: The Changing Role of Civil Legal Aid Within the Welfare State, in  A READER ON
RESOURCING CIVIL JUSTICE 213 (Alan Paterson & Tamara Goriely eds., 1996) (advancing a con-
trary view).
66. See AB and Others v John Wyeth & Brother Ltd., 7 MED. L. REP. 267, 278 (1996) (quot-
ing the May 6, 1992 judgement of J. Ian Kennedy); AB and Others v John Wyeth & Brother Ltd., 8
MED. L. REP. 57, 73 (1997) (per L.J. Brooke); Legal Aid Board, Issues arising for the Legal Aid
Board and the Lord Chancellor’s Department from multi-party actions ¶¶ 2.9, 2.21(1994).
67. See Group Actions Made Easier, THE L. SOC’Y ¶ 2.2.2 (1995).
68. See C. PRO. R. PRACTICE DIRECTION 19B (supplementing § III of Part 19 of the Civil
Rules of Procedure).
69. See HODGES, supra note 33, at ch.17 et seq.
70. See Neil Rickman, The Economics of Cost-Shifting Rules, in REFORM OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 327 (A.A.S. Zuckerman & Ross Cranston eds., 1995).
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having to meet the costs generated by the losing party opposing or
pressing the claim unsuccessfully.71
However, a claimant’s position was enormously assisted by the
fact that the normal cost allocation rule did not apply where the
claimant was in receipt of legal aid.  This suspension of the normal
rule was based on the policy that the claimant would, by definition,
be poor, having few if any resources to satisfy an award of costs, and
should therefore not be intimidated against enforcing genuine legal
rights by embarrassment over an absence of funds.  Moreover, the
policy protected the state against the risk of depletion of state re-
sources by cost orders against it.
The effect of this suspension of the normal rule, however, was
the widely recognized phenomenon of plaintiffs’ “legal aid black-
mail” of defendants, forcing defendants to settle claims that were of
lesser intrinsic merit than would normally be the case.72
This phenomenon has now been reversed, since the normal
“loser pays” rule applies where the claimant operates on a condi-
tional fee basis.  As explained in the Appendix, some public funding
remains available to support the investigation of claims or the cost of
very expensive claims that are otherwise run on a conditional fee ba-
sis, from specific capped central budgets earmarked for “Very Ex-
pensive” or “Multi-Party” cases.  Still, the claimant remains liable for
opponents’ costs if he loses; it is intended that this risk be covered by
private insurance, as is the position for all conditional fee arrange-
ments.  While some may argue that it will be rare that insurers will
underwrite this risk, in actuality, there is no reason why insurers
would not underwrite a good risk (like a multi-party claim with good
chances of success), as they were prepared to do for claims by service
personnel with “Gulf War Syndrome.”73
D. Absence of a Scrutiny Mechanism
The essential problem with the legal aid system rested with an
absence of non-partisan scrutiny of the merits of a claim.  The appli-
71. See Regulatory impact assessment: Improvement in the availability and use of condi-
tional fees (Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1998).
72. See Manley v. Law Soc’y 1 All E.R. 401, 411 (C.A. 1981); House of Commons Hansard
Debates, col. 875, July 2, 1996; Legal Aid: Targeting Need  Lord Chancellor’s Department Cm.
2854 (1995); R. S. Jandoo & W. Arthur Harland, Legal Aid Blackmail, 134 NEW L.J. 402 (1984).
73. See Indemnity for Gulf War Group Action, L. SOC’Y GAZETTE 1 (Sept. 3, 1997); Con-
ditional Fee Insurance Offer to Gulf War Veterans, 141 SOLICITORS J. 807 (1997); Gulf War
Conditional Fee Insurance Firm Named, 141 SOLICITORS J. 833 (1997).
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cant’s lawyer’s function under the legal aid system was both partisan,
as an advocate on behalf of his client’s case to the Board, and also in-
dependent, as advisor to the Legal Aid Board on the merits.  This
gave rise to an inherent conflict of interest for the lawyer.  Moreover,
it was in the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ personal financial interests to rec-
ommend that cases always be pursued, since they would be paid by
the Board regardless of the outcome of the case.74
The Board was hampered in its objective analysis of an applica-
tion by a number of factors.  First, it is essentially dependent for its
legal analysis on the partisan opinions of the applicant’s lawyer(s).75
In some circumstances, scrutiny of an application might be under-
taken by a lawyer at the Board, particularly for more expensive
claims, but that individual might not be expert in the subject matter
involved.
74. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
38, at 45 (noting that “[a]ttorney compensation is a critical determinant of consumer access [to
justice and compensation]”); George Pulman, Funding for Multi-Party Actions, in SHAPING THE
FUTURE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LEGAL SERVICES 196 (Roger Smith ed., 1995) (asserting that the
benzodiazepine litigation was “run for the benefit of lawyers . . . The Legal Aid Board spent about
£2,000-£3,000 per plaintiff to prove that there was no case”); Robin C. White & Rachel Atkinson,
Personal Injury Litigation, Conditional Fees, and After-the-Event Insurance, 19 CIV. JUST. Q. 188,
127 (2000) (“under legal aid there were cases where solicitors ran up significant fees on investiga-
tive costs and then ‘turned down’ the case”); In the News: Legal Aid “Fantasies” Attacked, 145
NEW L.J. 914, (1995) (quoting the deputy Vice-President of the Law Society as saying “[t]o some
people who read only the tabloid press, legal aid must look like a racket—promising support for
those of moderate means, but in practice providing it only to the poorest of the poor—and to some
wealthy exploiters of the system”); The Legal-Aid Budget: Out of Control, THE ECONOMIST, Sept.
16, 1995, at 20, 66 (“It is true that lawyers are assiduously milking the system . . . Too many weak
cases are backed”).
75. The expertise of Legal Aid Board staff is legal and administrative, rather than medical or
technical.  See House of Commons Hansard Debates, Written Answers, col. 845, Feb. 17, 1995.
The Legal Aid Board pointed out its frustration in the efficiency of the screening process where
it had to rely on lawyers who have a financial interest in the outcome.  See Legal Aid Board,
Issues for the Legal Aid Board and the Lord Chancellor’s Department in Multi-Party Actions
(May 1994).  In July 1997, Chancery Division judges wrote to the Lord Chancellor expressing
concern at a significant number of wasteful and undeserving cases funded by legal aid “that no-one
in their right minds would pursue if they were paying for them themselves” granted on the advice
of lawyers who are then paid to run them.  Frances Gibb, Judges Protest at “Far-Fetched” Legal
Aid Cases, THE TIMES, July 28, 1997, at 10.  Again in January 1999, Chancery Division judges
complained to the Lord Chancellor about the legal aid system’s inability to weed out weak cases.
See Clare Dyer, Judges Condemn Legal Aid “Waste”; Secret Report Attacks Funding of Hopeless
Cases, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 29, 1999, at 11.  The judges proposed that lawyers who advise on le-
gal aid should not then act in the case, and that opponents should have the right to ask the Board
to seek a second opinion on the merits of the case.  See id.  This issue motivated the Board’s in-
troduction of quality controls and assurances in the later 1990s.  See BRIAN MAIN & ALAN
PEACOCK, WHAT PRICE CIVIL JUSTICE? (2000).
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The Board was also hampered by a system, as it applied at the
time and before the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules, in
which a decision on funding was based almost entirely, and often
solely, on the evidence available to the claimant, rather than being
based on a complete picture of the case, taking into account the as-
sertions and evidence of the proposed defendant.  As explained, this
procedure has been changed under the new system, in which claim-
ants and defendants have to exchange their positions before com-
mencing proceedings so that an informed risk assessment on a claim
can be undertaken based on all the available evidence at that stage.
By contrast, under the new conditional fee system, the claimant’s
lawyer is no longer in a partisan role, since it is he who has to under-
take a risk assessment for his own purposes in deciding whether he is
personally prepared to invest in taking the case.  Furthermore, the
general need under this system for insurance against the risk of li-
ability for opponents’ costs means that insurers will play a crucial
quality control role in decisions regarding initiation and continuation
of cases.  To undertake effective quality control requires the objec-
tive assessment of comprehensive and reliable information; insurers
should rightly require more prior investigation of multi-party claims
than took place under the legal aid system, and reforms in Civil Pro-
cedure Rules (see Appendix) should assist this insurer activity.
The conclusion under the previous system was that the English
legal aid system funded, at enormous public expense,76 a sequence of
cases in which public concern over potential safety issues was gener-
ated by lawyers and media publicity.  Nearly all of these cases had
low intrinsic merits and subsequently failed, almost all of them in ad-
vance of a trial on the merits (many were struck-out for technical de-
ficiencies or withdrawn on subsequent legal advice).77
Various adverse consequences have been identified as flowing
from these cases.  First, there is the significant amount of wasted
public expenditure.  Secondly, there is the problem of the encour-
agement of public belief in the lack of safety of the products con-
cerned.  This is of particular significance given the fact that many of
the cases involved medicinal products.  Failure to take or continue
76. Public expenditure on the Benzodiazapine tranquilizer litigation alone was stated by
the Legal Aid Board to be £40,000,000.  See The Funding Code: a new approach to funding
civil cases, Legal Aid Board, Jan. 1999.
77. See Hodges, supra note 38, at 289.
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with medicinal therapy may result in adverse health consequences.78
Thirdly, similar “roller-coaster” emotions of claimants themselves
may lead to disenchantment with the defendants and the legal sys-
tem, but rarely with their own lawyers.79  Fourthly, various authors
have referred to the development of a “compensation culture”80
which encourages people to make claims for real or supposed misfor-
tunes, irrespective of causation or liability.81
V.  CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
A. European Compensation Mechanisms
There is a danger that those who study and practice tort law may
tend to overemphasize the importance of tort law as a socio-legal
mechanism, particularly because of an absence of familiarity with the
mechanisms of regulation, healthcare, and social security.  This point
resonates with serious criticism of the cost, inefficiency, and rarity of
the tort system’s concentration on the principle of full compensa-
tion.82  In summarizing the relative importance in Europe of tort law
and social security systems on the topic of compensation for injury,
the following was recently noted:
It is important to recognise that social security systems—not tort
law or the [product liability] Directive—are the principal mecha-
nisms of providing security and finance for injured citizens in
Europe.  This contrasts with USA where tort law has a much higher
social and Constitutional importance, the basic mechanism for
healthcare provision is by private insurance and perhaps 23% of the
78. Examples include fears of the safety of vaccines prompting discontinuation of immuni-
zation programs and increased incidence of death and morbidity of children and the discon-
tinuance of oral contraceptives causing increased pregnancy.
79. See AB and Others v. John Wyeth & Brother Ltd., 8 MED. L. REP. 57, 73-74 (1997)
(per L.J. Brooke); J Millington,  Breast Cancer Radiation Claims, MEDICAL LITIGATION 7 (
September 1999).
80. See FRANK FUREDI, COURTING MISTRUST: THE HIDDEN GROWTH OF A CULTURE OF
LITIGATION IN BRITAIN (1999).  See also Martyn Day, The Americanisers, J. OF BRIT. INS. L.
ASS’N  page 5 (May 1997).  But see J.R.A. Wylde, Letter to the Editor, J. OF BRIT. INS. L. ASS’N 5
(1997) (responding to Day’s article, criticizing U.S. plaintiffs’ lawyers for thriving on contingency
fees ‘by ramping-up the expectations of frequently unmeritorious parties”).
81. See Gerard Hanlon, A Profession in Transition?—Lawyers, The Market, and Signifi-
cant Others, 60 MOD. L. REV. 798, 813-815 (1997) (noting that most members of the public are
not skilled buyers of legal services, lacking both knowledge and economic power); Abel, supra
note 65, at 386 (“Legal aid is a social reform that begins with a solution—lawyers—and then looks
for a problem it might solve, rather than beginning with the problem—poverty, or oppression, or
discrimination, or capitalism—and exploring solutions.”).
82. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY (1997); PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (6th ed. 1999).
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population have no cover.  Furthermore, the level of social security
provision in Europe is generally high—very high (and very expen-
sive) in Scandinavian states.  The Scandinavian schemes for drug
injury compensation pre-dated the Directive and were designed for
the particular circumstance of the particular country, notably the
high level of existing social security . . .  It is important to remember
that a claimant under any compensation scheme or tort system still
has to establish causation, which can be difficult in relation to
healthcare products but must be faced as a matter of fairness as be-
tween claimants, particularly if some are inevitably to be held not to
qualify since their injuries cannot be proved to have been caused by
the product.83
B. Behavior Control: Regulation or Liability?
It is sometimes argued by apologists for the U.S. class action that
the mechanism of liability for payment of compensatory damages
through the civil courts is necessary, at least as a threat, to control
and modify behavior, particularly of large corporations.  In order to
establish the validity of this assertion, the following should logically
be shown:
 existing behavior patterns disregard relevant and justifiable
concerns;
 alternative mechanisms to control behavior either do not ex-
ist or do not function adequately;
 the liability mechanism can and does in fact operate effec-
tively to bring about modification in behavior which can be
accepted as beneficial;
 the costs and benefits of the liability mechanism are propor-
tionate: the incremental increase in protection is justified by
the increased cost.
There is no general call in Europe for regulation through litiga-
tion.  There also seems to have been no empirical research in Europe
to establish any of the points listed above.  There is evidence that, for
example, the general standard of safety for products marketed in
Europe is high and the level of safety defects is very low.84  It is a
policy requirement that governs EC regulatory Directives that meas-
ures concerning health, safety, environmental protection, and con-
83. European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, Response to
Product Liability Green Paper (1999), published at <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ internal_
market/en/goods/liability/replies.htm>.
84. See id.
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sumer protection must take as a base a high level of protection.85  The
U.K. Department of Trade and Industry has published research con-
cluding that “human behaviour seems to be the most common imme-
diate cause of home accidents, with faulty products and poor design
having an ever decreasing influence.”86  It has also been estimated
that the number of dangerous unrecalled products in use is very low
compared with the billions of products in use and that probably at
least seventy-five percent of home accidents that involve products in-
volve products that have been used for many years, with the accident
resulting from wear and tear and lack of due care and maintenance.87
Enforcement officials consider that unrecalled unsafe products in
Europe principally comprise cheap electrical products or toys that are
imported into the EU by small or medium sized companies, typically
from the Far East.88  This would point to a need for increased border
control and market surveillance rather than an unenforceable liability
mechanism.
If one were to accept for the sake of argument that a class action
mechanism can have a deterrent effect, its primary force would be
where cases are brought which are meritorious in revealing sub-
standard practice.  Two observations can be made on this in the
European context.  First, the multi-party cases that have been
brought to date in the United Kingdom have had overwhelmingly
poor merits.  Given the enormous costs of these actions to the public
purse and defendants, the argument that regulation should be under-
taken through deterrence is significantly undermined.
Secondly, most of the U.K. cases have involved industries that
are already heavily regulated.89  There is no evidence in those cases
that regulation was inappropriate or ineffective or that the corpora-
tions would have acted any differently at the relevant times.  If that is
so, the argument for indirect regulation by threat of litigation, as a
complementary mechanism to direct regulation by governmental
agencies, looks weak, unnecessarily duplicative, and wasteful of re-
sources.  If litigation does produce change, it seems to be a very
costly way of doing so.
85. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340)
1, art. 95 (1997).
86. Department of Trade and Industry, Research on the Pattern and Trends in Home Acci-
dents (1999), at 98.
87. See Department of Trade and Industry, Product Recall Research (2000).
88. See id.
89. See generally C.J.S. HODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS (Oxford, 2001).
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The essential tools of behavior modification of corporations or
executive agencies in Europe are consumer and media pressure, self-
regulatory codes of conduct, official regulation and scrutiny, and
court injunctions in urgent cases.  The European Community has,
over the past forty and particularly fifteen years, constructed complex
and sophisticated regulatory mechanisms to control commercial be-
havior.  The scale of European regulation is awesome, wide-ranging,
and continuing.  The areas covered include business organization,
product safety, environmental activities risking harm to the environ-
ment, and consumer trading protection.  Taking the example of
product liability again, many product sectors (medicines, medical de-
vices, machinery, electrical products, cosmetics, motor vehicles) now
have specific regulatory control mechanisms covering the design,
production, labeling, and post-marketing surveillance stages.
Authorities are designated to regulate and enforce the legislation.
Whilst work is constantly continuing on potential improvement of
these systems, there is no suggestion that the regulatory mechanisms
are systematically or institutionally inappropriate or ineffective.  It
would require a revolutionary change in European policy if these
regulatory mechanisms were to be declared ineffective and for there
to be a need for even supplemental regulation through compensation.
The point is sometimes made that regulation through litigation
incurs the risk of inconsistency among the many decisions that are
made constantly by regulatory agencies and the few and probably ill-
informed decisions made by civil courts.  This point has considerable
force in Europe, where the policy of the common market and eco-
nomic area, as laid down in the EC Treaty, is based precisely on the
harmonization and consistency of commercial activity between mem-
ber states in trade, economic behavior, regulatory action, and con-
sumer and environmental protection.  Achieving harmonized, consis-
tent standards is a fundamental policy of the EC legislation, which is
endemically organized to achieve this.  The institutionalization of po-
tential for the establishment of multiple standards of behavior being
set on the one hand by regulators, who operate within systems de-
signed to achieve consistency, and on the other hand by civil courts,
which have no knowledge of the regulatory framework or standards,
would be contrary to European policy and adversely affect the
Treaty’s requirements on free movement of goods.
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C. The U.S. Class Action “Threat”
Given its existing mechanisms, Europe has no need for U.S.-
style class action litigation.  A prevailing view amongst European ex-
perts is that the U.S. class action can simply be used to leverage large
sums of money from a corporation to claimant attorneys through
contingency fees “earned” in return for settling a large number of
claims sometimes of speculative value, as illustrated by the bendectin,
silicone, and dietary drug settlements.90  Such a settlement may be in
the corporation’s commercial interests in the U.S. context as it
achieves closure on the potential for multiple individual claims aris-
ing over many states for an uncertain period, each with a cost and
drain on resources and the risk of maverick jury awards.
The conclusion from these considerations is that the root causes
of the problem lie in the legal system’s unpredictable potential for
arbitrary variation in liability decisions, in the potential for very large
(again unpredictable and arbitrary) damages awards, and in the dis-
proportionate size of the commercial incentive to the plaintiffs’ law-
yers.  Europe is very keen to avoiding these aspects.91  As a matter of
public policy, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, the
U.K.’s supreme court, has held in a sequence of decisions92 that, as
Lord Steyn stated at the Duke/Geneva conference, “we do not want a
litigation-driven society,” and therefore placed a limit on the tort sys-
tem.93
One of the most important balancing controls is a rule that
whomever loses should pay most (but not all) of the winner’s legal
costs.  This is lacking from some EU jurisdictions (albeit ones which
do not have a high level of litigation in any event, so the rule may not
be a necessity)94 and its absence in the United States has contributed
90. See Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn
from Each Other?, organized by the Duke University School of Law and the University of Ge-
neva Faculty of Law at Geneva, Switzerland, July 21-22, 2000 (in which this view was expressed
by speakers from various European jurisdictions: Neil Andrews, Harald Koch, Judge Nordh,
and others).
91. The European Commission is to publish a Working Paper on the recovery of legal ex-
penses and lawyers fees in 2000.
92. See, e.g., McFarlane and Another v. Tayside Health Board, 2 App. Cas. 59 (2000) (ap-
peal taken from Scot.) (referring to distributive justice).
93. See Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn
from Each Other?, organized by Duke University School of Law and the University of Geneva
Faculty of Law at Geneva, Switzerland, July 21-22, 2000 (in which this view was expressed by
speakers from various European jurisdictions).
94. E.g., Luxembourg and Portugal.  See CHRISTOPHER HODGES, PRODUCT LIABILITY:
EUROPEAN LAWS AND PRACTICE 176-77 (1993).  Also, in a number of jurisdictions it is usual
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significantly to what many Europeans view as a grossly over-heated
litigation market.  Economic research noted above supports such a
rule, which encourages early settlement of litigation.
A central problem lies with the propensity of a system to gener-
ate poor claims and then its ability—or inability—to weed them out.
It is not difficult to support an aim of the efficient, timely, and pro-
portionate resolution of genuine cases.  History, however, reveals a
serious problem when access to justice is uncontrolled and the litiga-
tion economic system involves a level of transactional costs which is
too high.
VI.  SHOULD THERE BE A CLASS MECHANISM IN EUROPE
AND, IF SO, OF WHAT SORT?
The question remains, however, whether there should be a
mechanism for processing multiple claims in an efficient way, if mul-
tiple similar or identical claims arise.  It should first be asked whether
there is an actual or theoretical need.  It is striking that so very few
multiple claims, particularly genuine claims, have arisen in Europe
and that judges have not made loud calls that their existing proce-
dural powers to manage multiple claims are inadequate.
One type of multiple claim which can arise is a transport disas-
ter.95  Yet it can be quite possible to manage all of the claims indi-
vidually without creating a complex class mechanism.  All of the
various major airplane, railway, or oilrig incidents in the United
Kingdom during the past fifteen years settled before trial.96  Liability
was usually admitted (or a single test case resolved it), and the issues
which took time to resolve related to individual issues such as quan-
tum or verification of the claimant’s genuine facts.
A. The English Group Litigation Approach
The rule of civil procedure introduced in England and Wales in
May 2000, with its associated practice direction, is very brief.  It
builds on the experience of management issues which arose in the
succession of multi-party cases that occurred in the previous fifteen
years, but it is also influenced by the revolutionary philosophy to-
wards management of civil procedure generally, introduced by the
practice that the losing party does not end up paying a significant amount or all of the winning
party’s legal fees—for example, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Spain.  See id.
95. For example, the Piper Alpha oil platform disaster on July 6, 1998 (no citation possible
for this case as it settled before trial).
96. See HMSO, Lord Cullen, The Public Enquiry Into Piper Alpha Disaster (1990).
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Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (“CPR”).97  The new approach taken in
the CPR is that it is the court, not the parties, who control the speed,
complexity, and cost of litigation.  This approach derived from the
review undertaken by Lord Woolf in the mid-1990s which concluded
that litigation was too slow, complex, and costly. 98  The new approach
introduced radical exchanges in culture, with pre-action disclosure by
parties of the nature of their allegations and supporting evidence, in
accordance with official pre-action protocols, encouragement of early
settlement of disputes with institutionalized opportunities for media-
tion, extensive case management by the courts, including simplified
and accelerated procedures, and power for the courts to restrict evi-
dence or issues on the ground of disproportionality of costs.
Against this background, Rule 19.III facilitates the court to
manage particular multi-party litigation with maximum flexibility.
This Rule is more significant for what it omits than for the little it in-
cludes.  The Rule is triggered where there is an unspecified number
of individual cases that give rise to common or related issues of fact
or law, which the court must define as Group Issues.99  The procedure
is for opt-in of claimants rather than opt-out.  This trigger is deliber-
ately wide.  There is no need for formal consideration of U.S. Federal
Rule 23 issues such as predominance, since it is not institutionally in-
evitable under the English rule that all cases within the Group Litiga-
tion will be decided in the same way.  The constitution of a Group is
merely for managerial convenience and does not predict the way in
which the cases in the Group, or any sub-groups that may be created,
will be managed procedurally, still less decided.  It may be that a test
case or cases may be taken forward (but it may not), in which case
the Rule provides that a decision on one of the Group Issues is bind-
ing on the other cases within the Group (but not in relation to other
matters).  It is recognized that even if some issues may be resolved by
test cases, this cannot resolve any other individual issues of any other
cases in the group.
97. See C. PROC. R. 1998.
98. See generally LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE LORD
CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1995); LORD WOOLF,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996).
99. This mechanism should be distinguished from a historical rule (reproduced at CPR,
Rule 19.II) that one claimant may represent others where each has the same interest.  Rule
19.II has consistently been interpreted as requiring identical interest between those represented
and, accordingly, has not been used in modern multi-party litigation.
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The primary virtue of this approach is, therefore, its flexibility.
The Rule enables all similar cases to be transferred to a single man-
agement court and to be managed in a consistent, though not neces-
sarily identical, fashion.  The Rule is an enabling mechanism and
leaves extensive discretion to the managing judge.  It may be, for ex-
ample, that individual cases are not resolved together, or that the re-
sult in a small number of test cases does in fact bind all the others.
The English Rule adopts a minimalist procedural approach—this is
all, it is suggested, that is necessary.  Successful management of multi-
party claims will continue as before to depend on intelligent applica-
tion of discretion, assisted by knowledge of previous experience.100
The English Rule is, therefore, primarily about achieving effi-
cient administrative management of similar cases.  It does not, unlike
U.S. Federal Rule 23, require that all of the cases are substantively
the same and raise the same issues of substantive law.  The U.S. re-
quirement for substantive congruence requires a decision at the start
that the facts of all cases are predominantly identical and that com-
mon issues predominate.  In contrast, the English approach is more
flexible and only requires that some common or related issues arise.101
The former tends to an opt-out mechanism whereas the latter favors
opt-in, which has consequences in relation to the number of claimants
that might be involved.
VII.  CONCLUSIONS
A case of practical need for a multi-party rule of procedure in
Europe remains to be made out.  The only European jurisdictions
that have experienced significant multi-party litigation are England
and Wales, whose cases have overflowed somewhat to Scotland and
Ireland.  The English litigation can be seen as insubstantial, in that it
was largely an artifact of funding and other factors, albeit the cases
presented some procedural challenges before most of them collapsed
or were settled usually before trial.  An enabling and generalized rule
of procedure has recently been introduced, influenced by previous
experience in these cases and by the new general philosophy towards
litigation procedure.  This is all that is required.  Europe neither
needs nor wishes to import U.S.-style class action litigation, repre-
senting huge, avoidable, and unnecessary cost which distorts the
100. See generally C.J.S. HODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS (Oxford, 2001) (attempting to
collect such experience).
101. See C. PRO. R., Rule 19.III.
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economy by siphoning transactional costs towards service suppliers
who are enabled significantly to influence demand for their services.
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Brain damage 200 Cases collapsed in 1988
after a preliminary court
ruling in a test case that the







2,000 1,200 cases settled with total
payment reported to be
£2,275,000 and £4m costs in
1987: most of further 587




1,200 Settled by the Department
of Health in 1990 with the




Arachnoiditis 4,000 Settled in 1995 with £7m




Dependency 17,000 Case collapsed in 1994
when the Legal Aid Board
withdrew funding after
spending £40m in legal and
expert costs: defendants







100 Cases were successively
discontinued or withdrawn
until legal aid was
withdrawn from the
remaining 17 cases in 1996
after some 8 years’ funding.
Defendants made no
payments.
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Norplant Difficult extraction 324 All cases discontinued in
1999 against the
manufacturer after legal aid
was withdrawn from the
claimants just before trial




Viral contamination 98+ As at end of 1999, 32 cases
compensated.
Tobacco Lung cancer 50 All claims discontinued in
1999 after 9 cases failed on
a preliminary issue on
limitation.
Other Personal Injury Cases
British Coal Respiratory disease 75,000 Following judgment for the
plaintiffs on generic issues
in 1998, a scheme was
agreed for settlement of
individual claims.
British Coal Vibration White
Finger
50,000+ Following judgments for the
plaintiffs in lead cases on
breach of duty and
causation, a settlement
scheme was established in
1999 involving total
payments estimated at £500
million.
Financial Cases









12,300 £3.2 billion settlement
scheme agreed 1996
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Environmental Cases






39 Settled before trial
Sellafield Leukaemia in
children
2+40 Two test cases failed to
prove generic causation at
trial
HODGES.DOC 08/06/01  12:51 PM
2001] MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS: A EUROPEAN APPROACH 351
APPENDIX:  THE UNITED KINGDOM’S REFORMS
Effective from 1999-2000, a totally new system of funding litiga-
tion claims was introduced for England and Wales.  The system is
based on a client entering into a conditional fee agreement (CFA)
with his lawyer, under which the lawyer would usually receive noth-
ing if the case were lost, but would receive a basic fee plus a success
fee if the case were won or settled with a payment to the client.
The CFA differs from the U.S. contingency fee system in that
the latter is based on the lawyer receiving a percentage of the dam-
ages/settlement (which can often be a significant percentage and sig-
nificant sum, particularly given the high level of damages which pre-
vail in the United States), whereas the English CFA involves a basic
fee which is based on the lawyer’s hours worked at an agreed hourly
rate and the success fee is a percentage increase of the basic fee.
Economic analysis indicates that a system where lawyers’ fees are
based on a controlled percentage of timed work is preferable to one
based on a percentage of the total damage award in order not to en-
courage claims with low probability of success.102
The percentage increase under the CFA is agreed with the client
in writing in advance, and should reflect the degree of risk in the case.
Accordingly, if the case has a high chance of success (such as dam-
ages caused in a road traffic accident), only a low percentage increase
would be appropriate.  The Court has power to review and reduce
agreed percentages on the objection of the client or the opposing
party who is ordered to pay them.  The success fee may never be
more than 100% of the basic fee.103  The CFA must also satisfy certain
formal requirements.104
A CFA is almost invariably only entered into if it can be accom-
panied by an insurance policy which covers the client’s risk of expo-
sure to being ordered to pay the opponent’s legal costs if the client
loses the case.  The client may have pre-existing legal expenses insur-
ance (although perhaps only 17% of the U.K. adult population has
such cover, unlike very much more of the population in Germany,
Sweden, and France).105  Since CFAs were introduced in England and
102. See generally Donald N. Dewees et al., An Economic Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules
for Class Actions, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (1981).
103. See THE CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS ORDER 2000, S.I. 2000, No. 823.
104. See THE CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS ORDER 2000, S.I. 2000 No. 692.
105. See Policy Report: Legal Expenses; Insurance: Realising its Potential, CONSUMER’S
ASS’N (1998).
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Wales in 1995, the insurance industry has produced a variety of tai-
lor-made after-the-event policies designed to be used with CFAs,
some of which offer variations on payments of legal costs, disburse-
ments on experts’ fees and/or summary reimbursement for the losing
lawyer who would not otherwise be paid under the CFA.106
The end result is that the client should have no financial risk in
the litigation, but the lawyer usually runs the risk of not being paid if
he accepts a poor case.  Some public funding has been retained for
individuals with minimal resources, on the basis of the criteria set out
in The Funding Code.107  The public funds which are made available
through this successor mechanism to the legal aid scheme are subject
to finite budgets and are to be prioritized to cases concerning the wel-
fare of children, domestic violence, serious wrong-doing or breaches
of human rights by public bodies, and “social welfare” cases, includ-
ing housing proceedings and advice about employment rights, social
security entitlements, and debt.  Public funding is generally not avail-
able for death or personal injury negligence claims, subject to certain
exceptions.108  Some funding from a specific, capped budget is avail-
able for cases which fall within categories of “very expensive,”109
those involving a “wider public interest,”110 or (and this is the point of
particular relevance to this topic) multi-party actions.111
Furthermore, public funding may also be available to investigate
cases which are of uncertain merit up to the stage at which it can be
decided that the case is either sufficiently strong, in which case it
should be taken privately on a CFA without further public funding,
or is sufficiently weak to be dropped.112
A. The Advantages of a CFA Scheme
Overall, the effect of the reforms has been to restrict the avail-
ability of public funding, but to extend access to justice to the vast
majority of the population, which was previously denied it.  The ad-
vantage over the previous legal aid system is that CFAs for money
106. See the overview of products available on pages 10-14 of LITIGATION FUNDING (May
1999)—for instance Abbey Legal Protection runs Accident Line Protect (ALP) for the Law
Society.
107. See HMSO, The Funding Code: Access to Justice Act 1999 (2000) (a code offers a
more flexible and more speedily amended mechanism than the previous subsidiary legislation).
108. See Access to Justice Act, 1999, ch. 22, sched. 2 (Eng.).
109. The Funding Code, Part I, § 6.
110. The Funding Code, Part I, § 7.5.2.
111. See The Funding Code, Part 3.
112. See The Funding Code, Part I, § 5.8.
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claims may now be entered into by those who previously did not
qualify for legal aid but equally did not have sufficient resources to
bear the financial risk of entering into litigation, given its potentially
high costs and the risk of an order to pay opponents’ costs.
The measures which have by far the greatest impact on increas-
ing access to justice of both consumers and commercial entities, and
reducing the transactional costs of litigation, would be to
(a) harmonize and simplify the national rules of civil procedure,
and
(b) put in place national arrangements for funding civil litiga-
tion.
The combined effect of these measures would be to require parties
(both claimants and defendants) to investigate their cases before
commencing proceedings, exchange clear written statements of each
side’s case and supporting evidence before institution of litigation,
and engage in mediation with an attempt to settle their disputes be-
fore being permitted to commence litigation (so that when litigation
is commenced, it can be directed efficiently at the points still in dis-
pute, and the litigation process will be as efficient and swift as possi-
ble).  The litigation process should also involve some proportionality
between its transactional costs and the sums in dispute.
B. Related Reform of Civil Procedure Rules
Many of these aspects have recently been introduced in the
United Kingdom through the Civil Procedure Rules (introduced
from 1999)113 and the Access to Justice Act 1999.114  The simultaneous
113. See generally LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE LORD
CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1995); LORD WOOLF,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996); LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: THE WAY FORWARD (1996); LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT: THE FAST TRACK AND MULTI TRACK: A WORKING
PAPER (1997); LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULES ABOUT COSTS: CONSULTATION PAPER (1997); see also LORD CHANCELLOR’S
DEPARTMENT, CIVIL JUSTICE REVIEW: GENERAL ISSUES, recommendation 16 (1987) (a single
procedural code for civil business, covering all courts, had been proposed in Lord Chancellor’s
Department); LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, RIGHTS OF AUDIENCE AND RIGHTS TO
CONDUCT LITIGATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES: THE WAY AHEAD (1998).
114. See The Legal Aid (Notification of Very High Cost Cases) Regulations 2000, S.I. 2000,
No. 1801; The Civil Legal Aid (General) (Amendment) Regulations 2000, S.I. 2000, No. 451;
The Legal Aid in Civil Proceedings (Renumeration) (Amendment) Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999,
No. 3098; The Access to Justice (Membership Organisations)  Regulations 2000, S.I. 2000, No.
693.
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and coherent reform of both civil procedure and funding has pro-
duced in England and Wales an integrated system that has much to
commend it.  A principal change is that prospective litigants are re-
quired to disclose the nature of their cases and relevant evidence un-
der Pre-Action Protocols so as to facilitate settlement, although these
might not be applied where the court makes a Group Litigation Or-
der.115
115. Under C. PRO. R. 1998 there are Pre-Action Protocols on Clinical Negligence, Con-
struction and Engineering Disputes, Defamation and Personal Injury. (Other pre-action proto-
cols may subsequently be added).  See CIVIL PROCEDURE (The White Book) (2000).
